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The Civil Rights Pornography
Ordinances-An Examination
Under the First Amendment
INTRODUCTION
Pornography in America is an estimated seven billion dol-
lar a year industry.' Recent years have witnessed an increase
in "aggressive-erotica, ' 2 or pornography containing sexual
violence against women.' Alarmed about the harmful effects of
this trend, 4 feminists5 have sought to persuade city governments
6
I Wehrwein, Smut is Declared Illegal Sex Bias in Minnesota, Wash. Post, Dec.
31, 1983, § A, at 3, col. I.
2 Aggressive-erotica and violent pornography are synonymous terms. See note 3
infra. However, neither should be confused with the term "obscenity," which has a
more precise legal meaning. For a discussion of the definition of obscenity, see text
accompanying notes 55-68 infra.
' Violent pornography is depicted in films, magazines, books and, most recently,
rock music videos. One group concerned about the impact of this trend reported that
the lyrics of rock music are 115% more violent than they were 20 years ago. The
National Coalition on Television Violence found an average of 18 depictions of sexual
violence in one 24 hour period on MTV, Warner Communications' Music Television
cable channel. It concluded that 35% of all violence on MTV is of a sexual nature.
Michaelson, Sexual Violence and the Media, L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1983, § VI, at 8,
col. 1.
, Violent pornography ... portrays women as victims and depicts violence
against women as permissible or entertaining .... As the surrounding envi-
ronment becomes inundated with violent pornography, our society comes to
accept the view that women are objects to be brutalized .... [Women] are
posed in submissive positions, on the receiving end of sado-masochistic acts
of all varieties. Sex and aggression have become inextricably intermingled in
our society. The exhibition of erotic material elicits aggressive acts.
In sum, pornography promotes violence against women through rape and
sexual harassment. It also fosters the degradation of women by portraying
them as dominated and manipulated at the whim of men.
Violent Pornography and the First Amendment: A Dialogue, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 187, 189-90 (1978-79) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as DIALOGUE].
' The civil rights ordinances, or amendments thereto, which are discussed in this
Note were drafted by Catherine MacKinnon, Associate Professor of law at the University
of Minnesota, and Andrea Dworkin, a well-known feminist writer.
To date, Minneapolis, Minnesota and Indianapolis, Indiana have tried to enact
civil rights pornography ordinances.
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to enact legislation 7 creating a civil cause of action for
The Minneapolis City-Council approved the ordinance by a 7-6 vote, however,
Mayor Donald M. Fraser later vetoed the measure. The Council, after failing to override
the veto, enacted a competing ordinance which merely strengthened existing obscenity
laws. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 15, ch. 385 (1984).
The Indianapolis City-County Council enacted the civil rights pornography ordi-
nance on April 23, 1984 and amended it on June 11, 1984. The ordinance was prelimi-
narily enjoined pending the outcome of a suit filed by several national publishing trade
associations, a local bookseller and a local videotape dealer. See American Booksellers
Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984). The district court declared the
ordinance unconstitutional because it was vague and overbroad and because the state
had failed to demonstrate such a compelling interest in reducing sex discrimination as
would authorize the regulation of speech. Id. In affirming the district court, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the entire ordinance was invalid because its definition of pornog-
raphy was unconstitutionally broad. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, No. 84-
3147, slip op. (7th Cir. 1985).
The Minneapolis City Council passed a Resolution on July 13, 1984 declaring its
intention to enact the civil rights pornography ordinance pending the outcome of Amer-
ican Booksellers "when and if it is determined to be legally feasible to do so." Minne-
apolis, Minn. Resolution (July 13, 1984).
It is reported that at least 10 other city governments may attempt to enact the
civil rights pornography ordinances. ABC News Transcript Nightline Show No. 867,
Women and Pornography, at 3 (Sept. 18, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Nightline].
' INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CITY-COUNTY GENERAL ORDINANCE ch. 16 (1984) [herein-
after cited as INDIANAPOLIS ORD.] states in relevant part:
§ 16-3. Definitions.
As used in this chapter, the following terms shall have the meanings ascribed to
them in this section:
(g) Discriminatory practice shall mean and include the following:
(4) Trafficking in pornography: The production, sale, exhibition, or distri-
bution of pornography.
(A) City, state, and federally funded public libraries or private and
public university and college libraries in which pornography is available
for study, including on open shelves, shall not be construed to be traf-
ficking in pornography, but special display presentations of pornography
in said places is sex discrimination.
(B) The formation of private clubs or associations for purposes of
trafficking in pornography is illegal and shall be considered a conspiracy
to violate the civil rights of women.
(C) This paragraph (4) shall not be construed to make isolated passages
or isolated parts actionable.
(5) Coercion into pornographic performance: Coercing, intimidating or
fraudulently inducing any person, including a man, child or transsexual, into
performing for pornography, which injury may date from any appearance or
sale of any product(s) of such performance.
(A) Proof of the following facts or conditions shall not constitute a
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defense:
I. That the person is a woman; or
II. That the person is or has been a prostitute; or
III. That the person has attained the age of majority; or
IV. That the person is connected by blood or marriage to anyone
involved in or related to the making of the pornography; or
V. That the person has previously had, or been thought to have
had, sexual relations with anyone, including anyone involved in or
related to the making of the pornography; or
VI. That the person has previously posed for sexually explicit
pictures for or with anyone, including anyone involved in or related
to the making of the pornography at issue; or
VII. That anyone else, including a spouse or other relative, has
given permission on the person's behalf; or
VIII. That the person actually consented to a use of the perform-
ance that is changed into pornography; or
IX. That the person knew that the purpose of the acts or events
in question was to make pornography; or
X. That the person demonstrated no resistance or appeared to
cooperate actively in the photographic sessions or in the sexual
events that produced the pornography; or
XI. That the person signed a contract, or made statements affirm-
ing a willingness to cooperate in the production of pornography; or
XII. That no physical force, threats, or weapons were used in the
making of the pornography; or
XIII. That the person was paid or otherwise compensated.
(6) Forcing pornography on a person: The forcing of pornography on any
woman, man, child or transsexual in any place of employment, in education,
in a home, or in any public place.
(7) Assault or physical attack due to pornography: The assault, physical
attack, or injury of any woman, man, child, or transsexual in a way that is
directly caused by specific pornography.
(8) Defenses: Where the materials which are the subject matter of a complaint
under paragraphs (4), (5), (6), or (7) of this subsection (g) are pornography,
it shall not be a defense that the respondent did not know or intend that the
materials were pornography or sex discrimination; provided, however, that in
the cases under paragraph (g)(4) of § 16-3 or against a seller, exhibitor or
distributor under paragraph (g)(7) of § 16-3, no damages or compensation for
losses shall be recoverable unless the complainant proves that the respondent
knew or had reason to know that the materials were pornography. Provided,
further, that it shall be a defense to a complaint under paragraph (g)(4) of §
16-3 that the materials complained of are those covered only by paragraph
(q)(6) of § 16-3.
(q) Pornography shall mean the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women,
whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of the following:
(I) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation;
or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in
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being raped; or
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or
bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or
severed into body parts; or
(4) Women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement,
torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context
that makes these conditions sexual;
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, viola-
tion, exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of
servility or submission or display.
The use of men, children, or transsexuals in the place of women in paragraphs
(1) through (6) above shall also constitute pornography under this section.
§ 16-17. Grounds for complaint; persons who may file; persons against whom
complaint may be made.
(a) A complaint charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging
in a discriminatory practice ... may be filed with the office by any
person claiming to be aggrieved by the practice, or by one or more
members of the board or employees of the office who have reasonable
cause to believe that a violation ... has occurred, in any of the following
circumstances:
(6) In the cases of trafficking in pornography, coercion into pornographic
performances, and assault or physical attack due to pornography (as provided
in § 16-3(g)(7)) against the perpetrator(s), maker(s), seller(s), exhibitor(s), or
distributor(s).
(7) In the case of forcing pornography on a person, against the perpetrator(s)
and/or institution.
(b) In the case of trafficking in pornography, any woman may file a
complaint as a woman acting against the subordination of women and
any man, child or transsexual may file a complaint but must prove injury
in the same way that a woman is injured in order to obtain relief under
this chapter.
(c) In the case of assault or physical attack due to pornography, com-
pensation for losses or an award of damages shall not be assessed against
(1) maker(s), for pornography made, (2) distributor(s), for pornography
distributed, (3) seller(s), for pornography sold, or (4) exhibitor(s) for
pornography exhibited, prior to the effective date of this act.
§ 16-26. Hearings, findings and recommendations when conciliation not effected.
(a) Hearing to be held; notice. If a complaint filed pursuant to this
article has not been satisfactorily resolved ... the complaint adjudication
committee may hold a public hearing thereon upon not less than ten (10)
working days' written notice to the complainant or other aggrieved per-
son, and to the respondent ....
(b) Powers; rights of parties at hearing. In connection with a hearing
... , the complaint adjudication committee shall have power upon any
matter pertinent to the complaint or response thereto, to subpoena wit-
nesses and compel their attendance; to require the production of pertinent
books, papers or other documents; and to administer oaths. The com-
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plainant shall have the right to be represented by the chief officer or any
attorney of his/her choice. The respondent shall have the right to be
represented by an attorney or any other person of his/her choice. The
complainant and respondent shall have the right to appear in person at
the hearing, to be represented by an attorney or any other person, to
subpoena and compel the attendance of witnesses, and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses . ..
(c) Statement of evidence; exceptions; arguments. Within thirty (30)
working days from the close of the hearing, the complaint adjudication
committee shall prepare a report containing written recommended find-
ings of fact and conclusions and file such report with the office . ..
(e) Appeal to the board. Within thirty (30) working days after the
issuance of findings and conclusions by the committee, either the com-
plainant or the respondent may file a written appeal of the decision of
the committee to the board; ....
§ 16-27. Court enforcement.
(e) Trial de novo upon finding of sex discrimination related to pornog-
raphy. In complaints involving discrimination through pornography, ju-
dicial review shall be de novo. Notwithstanding any other provision to
the contrary, whenever the board or committee has found that a respond-
ent has engaged in or is engaging in one of the discriminatory practices
set forth in paragraph (g)(4) of Secction 16-3 or as against a seller,
exhibitor or distributor under paragraph (g)(7) of Section 16-3, the board
shall, within ten (10) days after making such finding, file in its own name
in the Marion County circuit or superior court an action for declaratory
and/or injunctive relief. The board shall have the burden of proving that
the actions of the respondent were in violation of this chapter.
Provided, however, that in any complaint under paragraph (g)(4) of
Section 16-3 or against a seller, exhibitor or distributor under paragraph
(g)(7) of Section 16-3 no temporary or permanent injunction shall issue
prior to a final judicial determination that said activities of respondent
do constitute a discriminatory practice under this chapter.
Provided further, that no temporary or permanent injunction under
paragraph (g)(4) of Section 16-3 or against a seller, exhibitor or distrib-
utor under paragraph (g)(7) of Section 16-3 shall extend beyond such
material(s) that, having been described with reasonable specificity by the
injunction, have been determined to be validly proscribed under the
ordinance.
Minneapolis, Minn. Proposed Ordinance [hereinafter cited as Proposed Minneapolis
Ord.] amending tit. 7, ch. 139 of the MINNEAPous, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES, states
in relevant part:
§ 1. That § 139.10 ... be amended to read as follows:
(b) Declaration of policy and purpose. It is the public policy of the City of Minneapolis
and the purpose of this title:
(4) To PREVENT AND PROHIBIT ALL DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES OF SEXUAL
10851984-1985]
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SUBORDINATION OR INEQUALITY THROUGH PORNOGRAPHY; ....
§ 3. That § 139.20 ... be amended ... to read as follows:
(gg) Pornography. Pornography is a form of discrimination on the basis of sex.
(1) Pornography is the sexually explicit subordination of women, graphically
depicted, whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of
the following:
(i) women are presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things or com-
modities; or
(ii) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humilia-
tion; or
(iii) women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleas-
ure in being raped; or
(iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated
or bruised or physically hurt; or
(v) women are presented in postures of sexual submission; or
(vi) women's body parts-including but not limited to vaginas, breasts,
and buttocks-are exhibited, such that women are reduced to those parts;
or
(vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or
(viii) women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abase-
ment, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in
a context that makes these conditions sexual.
(2) The use of men, children, or transsexuals in the place of women in (1)(i-
ix) above is pornography for purposes of subsections (l)-(p) of this statute.
§ 4. That § 139.40 ... be amended ... to read as follows:
(1) Discrimination by trafficking in pornography. The production, sale, exhibition, or
distribution of pornography is discrimination against women by means of trafficking in
pornography:
(1) City, state, and federally funded public libraries or private and public
university and college libraries in which pornography is available for study,
including on open shelves, shall not be construed to be trafficking in pornog-
raphy but special display presentations of pornography in said places is sex
discrimination.
(2) The formation of private clubs or associations for purposes of crafficking
in pornography is illegal and shall be considered a conspiracy to violate the
civil rights of women.
(3) Any woman has a cause of action hereunder as a woman acting against
the subordination of women. Any man or transsexual who alleges injury by
pornography in the way women are injured by it shall also have a cause of
action.
(in) Coercion into pornographic performances. Any person, including a transsexual,
who is coerced, intimidated, or fraudulently induced (hereafter, "coerced") into per-
forming for pornography shall have a cause of action against the maker(s), seller(s),
exhibitor(s) or distributor(s) of said pornography for damages and for the elimination
of the products of the performance(s) from the public view.
(1) Limitation of action. This claim shall not expire before five years have
elapsed from the date of the coerced performance(s) or from the last appear-
ance or sale of any product of the performance(s), whichever date is later;
(2) Proof of one or more of the following facts or conditions shall not,
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women8  offended by violent or abusive pornography. The
measures would allow women to allege a violation of their
civil rights, and seek damages or injunctions against the sale,
distribution or display of pornographic material. 9
At the same time, many civil libertarians have expressed
concern, and even outrage, 0 at what they consider an in-
without more, negate a finding of coercion;
(i) that the person is a woman; or
(ii) that the person is or has been a prostitute; or
(iii) that the person has attained the age of majority; or
(iv) that the person is connected by blood or marriage to anyone in-
volved in or related to the making of the pornography; or
(v) that the person has previously had, or been thought to have had,
sexual relations with anyone, including anyone involved in or related to
the making of the pornography; or
(vi) that the person has previously posed for sexually explicit pictures
for or with anyone, including anyone involved in or related to the making
of the pornography at issue; or
(vii) that anyone else, including a spouse or other relative, has given
permission on the person's behalf; or
(viii) that the person actually consented to a use of the performance
that is changed into pornography; or
(ix) that the person knew that the purpose of the acts or events in
question was to make pornography; or
(x) that the person showed no resistance or appeared to cooperate
actively in the photographic sessions or in the sexual events that produced
the pornography; or
(xi) that the person signed a contract, or made statements affirming a
willingness to cooperate in the production of the pornography; or
(xii) that no physical force, threats, or weapons were used in the making
of the pornography; or
(xiii) that the person was paid or otherwise compensated.
(n) Forcing pornography on a person. Any woman, man, child, or transsexual who
has pornography forced on him/her in any place of employment, in education, in a
home, or in any public place has a cause of action against the perpetrator and/or
institution.
(o) Assault or physical attack due to pornography. Any woman, man, child, or trans-
sexual who is assaulted, physically attacked or injured in a way that is directly caused
by specific pornography has a claim for damages against the perpetrator, the maker(s),
distributor(s), seller(s), and/or exhibitor(s), and for an injunction against the specific
pornography's further exhibition, distribution, or sale. No damages shall be assessed (A)
against maker(s) for pornography made, (B) against distributor(s) for pornography
distributed, (C) against seller(s) for pornography sold, or (D) against exhibitors for
pornography exhibited prior to the ENFORCEMENT date of this act.
I Men, transsexuals and children may also be plaintiffs. However, this Note will
refer only to female plaintiffs, since the ordinances were drafted primarily to protect
women. See INDIAHAPOLis ORD. ch. 16, § 16-3(g)(5)-(7), -3(q)(6); Proposed Minneapolis
Ord., § 3, (gg)(2), § 4(l)(3).
Wehrwein, supra note 1.
,0 "This ordinance ... remains a serious, misguided threat to civil liberties. To
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fringement of the first amendment guarantee of freedom of
expression." They have argued that the civil rights pornog-
raphy ordinances are unconstitutionally vague and over-
broad.' 2 This Note examines the constitutionality of the
ordinances from a first amendment freedom of speech per-
spective and concludes that the ordinances are constitu-
tional.
I. PAST TREATMENT OF PORNOGRAPHY AND OBSCENITY
Historically, state and local governments have sought to
curb sexually explicit material in various ways, with mixed
results. Some have enacted public nuisance' 3 statutes which
impose criminal' 4 or civil'5 sanctions against the purveyors
of obscenity. Based upon the common law idea that sex-
ually explicit material is a danger to the morals of the gen-
eral public,' 6 these statutes have met with limited success.
Courts have held the sweeping nature of some of the sta-
tutory sanctions-for example, padlock orders closing stores
or theatres for a specified length of time, and blanket in-
juctions prohibiting the future distribution of unnamed films
or books' 7-unconstitutional as prior restraints' s on free
punish fantasy, however vile or violent, is to do violence to the First Amendment."
Osterman, The Censor's Pen is Not Women's Best Protection, L.A. Times, June 17,
1984, § IV, at 5, col. 5.
" See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .. ").
12 "[T]he vagueness in such a measure is exceeded only by its breadth. Just where
is the line? When it equates depictions with discrimination, the ordinance indiscriminately
sweeps before it not just historical, scientific and scholarly material of great value, but
also a staggering litany of art and literature .. " Osterman, supra note 10.
,1 There were two kinds of nuisances at common law-private and public. Private
nuisance, a tort, covered activities of a property owner who interfered with property use
or enjoyment of another property owner. Public nuisance was at common law a crime,
and generally included any activity that might endanger the safety, health or morals of
the general public. Activities such as prostitution, gambling or obscene displays were
labelled "nuisances per se" and were generally prohibited at common law. See Note,
Pornography, Padlocks, and Prior Restraints: The Constitutional Limits of the Nuisance
Power, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1478, 1484 (1983).
14 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.45 (McKinney 1979).
11 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-01
(1976).
,6 See note 13 supra.
" See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 52-401 to -417 (1979 & Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 19-1(c) (1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.03-.06 (Page 1980); TEx. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. arts. 4666-7 (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1985).
,1 See note 19 infra. For a discussion of prior restraint, see text accompanying
notes 132-37 infra.
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speech. 9 Moreover, courts and legislatures have struggled
with defining what is obscene, 2° resulting in the imprecise
application of obscenity laws. 21
Other cities have used zoning laws and building code
enforcement to restrict the areas in which sexually explicit
material may be displayed or sold. 22 These laws do not,
however, eradicate sexually explicit material. They merely
contain its availability. The material is still accessible to
those wishing to enter the "combat zones. ' 23  The courts
have generally upheld such statutes24 provided that they do
not have "the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting
access to, lawful speech." ' 25
19 See, e.g., Spokane Arcades, Inc. v. Brockett, 631 F.2d 135, 138 (9th Cir. 1980)
(mem.) (declaring Washington's provision for blanket injunctions and padlock orders
unconstitutional), aff'd, 454 U.S. 1022 (1981); Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587
F.2d 159, 169 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (declaring blanket injunctions unconstitutional
as prior restraint), aff'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam); General
Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 320 So. 2d 668, 675 (Ala. 1975) (declaring padlock
provision unconstitutional), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Sanders v. State, 203
S.E.2d 153, 157 (Ga. 1974) (striking down padlock order). But see FehIhaber v. State
of North Carolina, 675 F.2d 1365, 1371 (4th Cir. 1982) (declaring North Carolina's
blanket injunctions constitutional); State ex rel. Kidwell v. U.S. Marketing, Inc., 631
P.2d 622, 629 (Idaho 1981) (upholding padlock order), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 1009
(1982); State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without a Stitch," 307 N.E.2d 911, 917 (Ohio 1974)
(upholding padlock order), appeal dismissed sub nom. Art Theatre Guild, Inc. v. Ewing,
421 U.S. 923 (1975).
- For a discussion of obscenity, see text accompanying notes 55-68 infra.
21 Obscenity laws, besides allowing inconsistent, ill-conceived or politically
motivated criminal prosecutions, created a lot of confusion about pornography
by misidentifying the harm .... Obscenity is a social value judgment....
Everybody may have an idea of what is or is not obscene, especially given the
myriad inconsistent legal definitions over the last [200] years.
Memorandum to Minneapolis City Council by Catherine A. MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin, at 6 (Dec. 26, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
1 See, e.g., DErRorr, MICH., ZoNING ORDINANCE § 66.000.
23 Legislators frequently overlook the detrimental effect of zoning on lower-class
neighborhoods. Too often city councils are tempted to zone sex shops and "adult"
bookstores in the poorer sections of town, without fully considering the harm suffered
by the elderly and poor who are unable to move elsewhere. See Memorandum, supra
note 21, at 8.
24 In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the Supreme
Court upheld a Detroit zoning law which required adult theatres to be located at
prescribed distances from each other. See id. at 52-53. Justice Stevens, writing for a
plurality, noted that even though the films shown by the theatres were protected by the
first amendment, the zoning ordinance served the important interest of preventing urban
decay and had only a de minimus impact on the availability of adult films to the general
public. See id. at 62-63.
Id. at 71 n.35.
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Proponents of the civil rights pornography ordinances
maintain that these other methods have not effectively dealt
with what they perceive as a growing national problem. 26
The ordinances are the first to recognize pornography as a
violation of women's civil rights.2 7 Designed primarily to af-
ford a cause of action to women who have pornography
"forced on them" in stores, at newsstands or in their
homes, the ordinances also apply to women coerced into
performing pornographic acts and to women physically
harmed as a direct result of pornography.2 The ordinances
also prohibit trafficking in pornography. 29
26 The proposed ordinance differs from past approaches by going significantly
beyond any existing law that regulates acts committed against women. Now,
before this law, people who are coerced into pornography have no effective
way to reach the pornography made by coercing them. The profit incentive
to coercing more and more women remains. If they complain, they are not
believed, in part because pornography in general convinces people that women
love doing it and in part because the specific pornography they are forced to
make is often convincing in depicting their simulated enjoyment. Now, before
this law, when women are sexually assaulted, because the society is saturated
by pornography, they are unlikely to be believed in court and are continually
asked pornographic questions like, did you like it? ...
Unlike all other previous approaches to the growing social problem of
pornography ... this law stands against the real traffic in real women. It is
a civil law against pornography, but is also for the equality of the sexes,
women's rights, and the integrity and dignity of all persons regardless of sex.
And it will do something: empower people and call into question the legal
immunity of the exploiters for the first time.
Memorandum, supra note 21, at 7-8 (emphasis in original).
" The drafters of the Minneapolis ordinance reflected the basis for the statute in
a section marked "Special Findings on Pornography:"
[Plornography is central in creating and maintaining the civil inequality of the
sexes. Pornography is a systematic practice of exploitation and subordination
based on sex which differentially harms women. The bigotry and contempt it
promotes, with the acts of aggression it fosters, harm women's opportunities
for equality of rights in employment, education, property rights, public ac-
comodations and public services; create public harassment and private deni-
gration; promote injury and degradation such as rape, battery and prostitution
and inhibit just enforcement of laws against these acts; contribute significantly
to restricting women from full exercise of citizenship and participation in
public life, including in neighborhoods; damage relations between the sexes;
and undermine women's equal exercise of rights to speech and action guar-
anteed to all citizens under the constitutions and laws of the United States
and the state of Minnesota.
Proposed Minneapolis Ord. § 1, (a)(1).
See INDIANAPOLIS ORD. ch. 16, § 16-3(g)(5)-(7); Proposed Minneapolis Ord. §
4, (m)-(o).
See IND iA A'OLIS ORD. ch. 16, § 16-3(g)(4); Proposed Minneapolis Ord. § 4,
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The civil rights ordinances raise a possible conflict be-
tween the civil rights of the aggrieved plaintiffs3 ° and the
first amendment rights of the defendants. Moreover, the in-
terests and rights of the general public must also be consid-
ered.
II. SPEECH UNPROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The first amendment guarantees a right of free speech.
However, "It]here are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem."' 31 The Supreme Court has recognized four cate-
gories of unprotected speech relevant to this Note: 32 words
that pose a "clear and present danger" to the public wel-
fare; 33 speech that is abusive or threatening; 34 obscenity;35 and
child pornography. 6 The following section defines these cat-
egories of unprotected speech and discusses whether pornog-
raphy as defined by the civil rights ordinances could
conceivably fit into each category.
A. Words Posing A Clear and Present Danger
The clear and present danger category of unprotected
speech originated in the Brandeis-Holmes concurrence in
Whitney v. California.3 7 Justice Brandeis, although recogniz-
See note 27 supra.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
'2 Other categories of unprotected speech, such as defamation, are beyond the
scope of this Note. See generally L. Tmasa, Aim=RCAN CONSTruTIONAL LAW § 12-1
(1978).
11 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
'4 See 315 U.S. at 573.
" See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
17 274 U.S. 357 (1927). In Whitney, the Court upheld the conviction of the
appellant for violating the California Criminal Syndicalism Act which prohibited "ad-
vocating... crime, sabotage ... or unlawful acts of force and violence." Id. at 359-
60. The appellant was a member of the Communist Labor Party of California which
advocated social change through violence and terrorism. Id. at 363-66.
Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney was actually more a dissent. He upheld
the appellant's conviction, but only on the procedural ground that she had failed to
allege that no clear and present danger actually existed. Drawing heavily on Justice
Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Justice Brandeis
maintained that "the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies." 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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ing the danger that could result from allowing the unfet-
tered advocacy of unlawful acts, observed:
But even advocacy of [law] violation however reprehensi-
ble morally, is not a justification for denying free speech
where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is
nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immedi-
ately acted on....
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear
and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended
is so imminent that it may befall before there is oppor-
tunity for full discussion."
After adopting the Brandeis-Holmes doctrine of clear and
present danger in Herndon v. Lowry,39 the Supreme Court
wavered on the precise application of the doctrine. 40 Finally,
in Brandenburg v. Ohio,41 the Court outlined the modern
274 U.S. at 376-77.
3 301 U.S. 242, 256 (1937).
40 See, e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 131-37 (1966) (holding that petitioner's
right of free expression violated by Georgia House of Representatives' refusal to admin-
ister oath of office to petitioner for allegedly subversive comments); Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 219-30 (1961) (upholding petitioners' convictions under the Smith
Act); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 326-27 (1957) (reversing petitioners' convic-
tions under the Smith Act); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 515-17 (1951)
(upholding petitioner's conviction under the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1948));
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1949) (reversing appellant's convicton under
Chicago breach of peace ordinance); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1947)
(reversing appellant's contempt conviction for publishing news articles criticizing Texas
court); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348-50 (1946) (reversing appellant's con-
tempt convicton for publishing editorials and cartoons criticizing Florida trial court);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 277-78 (1941) (reversing appellant's conviction for
contempt of court based upon his publication of a letter criticizing the decision of a
judge); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310-11 (1940) (reversing appellants'
convictions under Connecticut law forbidding the solicitation of money for religious
causes without a license); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1940) (reversing
appellant's conviction under a Tuscaloosa County, Alabama loitering statute); DeJonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 366 (1937) (reversing appellant's conviction under Oregon
Criminal Syndicalism Act).
' 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). In Brandenburg, the Court reversed the
conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism
statute for advocating "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism."
The Court invalidated the statute, since it punished "mere advocacy not distinguished
from incitement to imminent lawless action." Id. at 449.
The appellant Ku Klux Klan leader had invited newsmen to a rally in which he and
several other Klan members attended. The film reports of the rally showed twelve hooded
figures, some armed, burning a cross. The appellant made a speech describing the
group's plan to march on Washington, D.C. and noted "there might have to be some
revengeance [sic] taken." Id. at 446. A number of racial slurs were also uttered. Id. at
444-47.
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formulation of the clear and present danger category. The
Court stated that for words to constitute a clear and pres-
ent danger, they must be "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and be likely to incite or produce
such action." 42
Even assuming there is a causal connection between vi-
olent or abusive pornography and the perpetration of viol-
ence against women, 43 it is doubtful that pornography as
defined by the civil rights ordinances falls into the clear and
present danger category of unprotected speech. Some exam-
ples of pornography as defined by the civil rights ordi-
nances obviously advocate the perpetration of crime, yet lack
the immediacy element required by Brandenburg. For ex-
ample, an article entitled "The Joy of Rape: How To, Why
To, Where To" 44 providing an illustrated guide (complete
with regional maps) on how to rape a woman and get away
with it, constitutes violent pornography as defined by the
civil rights ordinances. Such an article advocates an unlaw-
ful action (rape) and it is arguably likely to incite or pro-
duce such action. However, "it amount[s] to nothing more
than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future
time. This is not sufficient to ... punish ... speech. ' 45
B. Abusive Speech
The Supreme Court stated in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire46 that for words to be considered "abusive
speech," they must be addressed to a person in a public
place. 47 The Court recognized that "IT]he states are free to
11 Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
"1 For a discussion of the causal link between depictions of violent pornography
and the subsequent commission of crime, see text accompanying notes 105-11 infra.
Sex Now, publication date unavailable.
• Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (anti-war demonstrator's conviction
for violation of disorderly conduct statute reversed because defendant's words were not
intended or likely to produce imminent disorder).
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
47 The appellant was convicted under a New Hampshire statute which prohibited
any person from addressing "any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other
person who is lawfully in any street or other public place." Id. at 569. The appellant,
a leader of a religious sect, addressed the City Marshall of Rochester, New Hampshire
as "God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist and the whole government of
Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists." Id.
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ban the simple use, without a demonstration of additional
justifying circumstances, of so-called 'fighting words,' those
personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the or-
dinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, in-
herently likely to provoke violent reaction. ' 41 The Court
further narrowed the so-called "fighting words" exception
when it set forth the requirement in Cohen v. California49
that the abusive public speech be directed at a particular
person, rather than at some third person not present."
While some may believe that pornography as defined by
the civil rights ordinances constitutes abusive epithets, 5' it is
doubtful that it could meet the particularity requirements of
Chaplinsky and Cohen. Although it is conceivable that por-
nography could be used to provoke a woman into a violent
reaction, 52 it is unlikely that every sale, use or display of
pornography "could reasonably [be] ... regarded ... as a
direct personal insult." 53 Moreover, the ordinances afford a
cause of action to women offended by the pornography in
their homes.5 4 This is clearly outside the scope of Chaplin-
sky. Therefore, pornography as defined by the civil rights
ordinances does not constitute "fighting words."
C. Obscenity
It is more plausible to argue that pornography is unpro-
tected speech because it is obscene. In Roth v. United
States,55 the Supreme Court held that "obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
41 Id. at 573.
,9 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). The Court in Cohen reversed the convicton of the
appellant who was convicted of violating a Calif6rnia statute prohibiting the disturbing
of the peace by "offensive conduct." The appellant was arrested for wearing a jacket
bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a Los Angeles courthouse. Id. at 26.
10 Id. at 20.
1, See DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 188.
52 See Allred, Pornographer's Rights End Where the Victim's Begin, L.A. Times,
July 22, 1984, § VI, at 5, col. 1.
" 403 U.S. at 20.
See INDIANAPOLIS ORD. ch. 16, § 16-3(g)(6); Proposed Minneapolis Ord. § 4,
(n).
" 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In Roth the Court upheld a conviction under a federal
statute making criminal the mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy" materials.
See id. at 476 n.1.
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press. ' 5 6 The Court stated that the test for obscenity"7 was
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. '5 8 In A Book
Named John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure
v. Attorney General of Massachusetts5 9 the Court sharply
narrowed its definition of obscenity6O by requiring that: "(a)
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole [ap-
peal] to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material [be] pat-
ently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of
sexual matters; and (c) the material [be] utterly without re-
deeming social value."' Finally, in Miller v. California,62 the
Court devised a more workable obscenity test:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 63
-6 Id. at 485.
57 Currently no states use a pure Roth standard for determining obscenity. See 458
U.S. at 755-56 n.7.
51 354 U.S. at 489.
19 383 U.S. 413 (1966). In Memoirs the Court overturned a Massachusetts obscenity
statute conviction that was based on a finding that the book Fanny Hill was obscene.
See id. at 421.
- Four states follow the Memoirs test of obscenity. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 311(a) (West Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-193(a) (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. §
847.07 (1976 & Supp. 1985); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20(b) (Smith-Hurd 1979).
11 383 U.S. at 418.
62 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The appellant in Miller was convicted under a California
statute for the mailing of unsolicited obscene brochures. Id. at 16-17. The Court vacated
the appellant's conviction and remanded the case to the California courts for consider-
ation under the new test. See id. at 37.
61 Id. at 24 (citations omitted). Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia
have adopted the Miller test for obscenity. See Lakin v. United States, 363 A.2d 990,
994 (D.C. 1976); Ebert v. Md. St. Bd. of Censors, 313 A.2d 536, 541 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1973); People v. Neumayer, 275 N.W.2d 230, 239 (Mich. 1979); State v. Welke,
216 N.W.2d 641, 645 (Minn. 1974); State v. Burgun, 384 N.E.2d 255, 259-60 (Ohio
1978); McCrary v. State, 533 P.2d 629, 633-34 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974); ALA. CODE §
13A-12-150(1) (1982); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN § 13-3501(2) (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
41-3502(6) (1977); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-7-101(2) (Supp. 1984); DEt. CODE ANN. tit.
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Most of what is prohibited by the civil rights pornog-
raphy ordinances could arguably fit under the Miller defi-
nition of obscenity. For example, the ordinances describe
pornography as graphically depicting women "as sexual ob-
jects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physi-
cally hurt." 64 These portrayals could be considered patently
offensive 65 and appealing to the prurient interest. 66 However,
the Minneapolis ordinance also prohibits depictions of women
"as whores by nature." 67 This vague prohibition likely cov-
ers expressions that would not be obscene under Miller.
Most notably absent from the civil rights ordinances is
any requirement that objectionable material be viewed as a
whole before being judged pornographic. Moreover, no
finding as to the artistic or scientific value of the material
is required, nor is there any requirement that the pornog-
raphy offend contemporary community values as applied by
the average person. Perhaps the drafters believed that the
incorporation of the Miller elements would lead to the same
enforcement problems that have hampered obscenity law. 6S
11, § 1364 (Supp. 1984); GA. CODE § 16-12-80(b) (1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 712-
1210(6) (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-4101(A) (1979); IOWA CODE § 728.4 (1984); IND.
CODE § 35-30-10.1-1(c) (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4301(2)(a) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 531.010(3) (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106(A)(2)-(a) (West Supp. 1985); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 31 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1984); Mo. REV. STAT. §
573.010(1) (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-807(9) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.235(4)
(1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 650:1(IV) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-2(1)
(West Supp. 1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00(1) (McKinney 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
14-190.1(b) (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-27.1-01(4) (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.087(2)
(1981); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 5903(b) (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-31-1
(1981); S.C. CODE § 16-15-260(a) (1985); S.D. CODIID LAWS ANN. § 22-24-27(10)
(1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-6-1101(5) (1982); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21(a)(1)
(1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1203(1) (1978); VA. CODE § 18.2-372 (1982); WASH.
REv. CODE § 968.050(2) (1983).
, INDIANAPOLIS ORD. ch. 16, § 16-3 (q)(3); Proposed Minneapolis Ord. § 3,
(gg)(1)(iv).
6$ In Miller, the Court gave the following examples of patently offensive depictions:
"(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal
or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions
of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U.S. at
25.
The Court in Roth defined "prurient" as "material having a tendency to excite
lustful thoughts." 354 U.S. at 487 n.20.
67 Proposed Minneapolis Ord. § 3, (gg)(l)(vii).
61 "Because the definition [of pornography] in the ordinance is concrete, specific,
narrow, and describes what is actually there, is not vague, not overly broad, not about
ideas that some people think are good or bad, moral or immoral, normal or abnormal,
natural or unnatural. . . ." Memorandum, supra note 21 at 7.
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D. Child Pornography
Child pornography69 is the most recently recognized cat-
egory of unprotected speech. In New York v. Ferber,70 the
Supreme Court held that states may prohibit child pornog-
raphy if the statute in question7' proscribes the visual de-
piction of children engaged in sexual acts and includes
scienter as an element of the offense. 72 The Court based the
decision on several factors. First, it noted that the states
have a "compelling" interest "in safeguarding the physical
and psychological well being of a minor. ' 73 The Court rec-
ognized "the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of
children" as an important governmental interest. 74 Second,
films and photographs depicting minors engaged in sexual
acts serve as permanent reminders of the acts, thereby ex-
acerbating the harm to the children involved. 75 The Court
stated that the distribution of such material must be halted
to end the sexual abuse of children. 76 Third, because the
production of child pornography is necessarily illegal-re-
quiring sexual abuse of a child-the economic impetus to
make such materials should be removed. 77 Fourth, the social
- For a discussion of the problems associated with child pornography, see Com-
ment, Preying on Playgrounds: The Sexploitation of Children in Pornography and
Prostitution, 5 PEPPERDiNE L. REv. 809 (1978).
7 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
' In Ferber, the appellant was convicted of violating N.Y. PENAL LAw § 263.15
(McKinney 1984) which states: "A person is guilty of promoting a sexual performance
by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or
promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen
years of age." See 458 U.S. at 751.
72 See 458 U.S. at 764-65 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), and
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974)).
" Id. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982)).
74 See id. at 757.
"1 Id. at 759.
7 See id. at 757-58. See also Comment, supra note 69, at 814-17 (study finding
that large amounts of child pornography are seized by police when making child
molestation arrests and that law enforcement officials are, consequently, convinced of a
direct link between child pornography and child abuse).
It is interesting that courts and law enforcement officials recognize the link between
child pornography and the subsequent abuse of children, but refuse to acknowledge the
same link between pornography and the abuse of women. For a discussion of causality,
see text accompanying notes 105-11 infra.
See 458 U.S. at 761-62.
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value of live performances and depictions of minors en-
gaged in sex acts was found to be de minimus.7 8 Fifth, the
evil to be restricted "overwhelmingly outweigh[s] the expres-
sive interests ... at stake." 79
All pornography is not, of course, child pornography. 80
The civil rights ordinances proscribe the violent and abusive
sexual depictions of women as well as children. It is inter-
esting to note, however, that several of the justifications
recognized by the Court in Ferber are similar to those ar-
gued by the proponents of the civil rights ordinances.
The first reason cited by the Court could be applied to
women as well. Just as a city or state has an important
governmental interest in preventing the abuse of children, it
should have a similar interest in preventing the abuse of
women. The Court in Ferber recognized that the use of mi-
nors in pornographic acts is injurious to the physiological,
emotional and mental health of the children. 8' The Court
noted that abused children have difficulty in maintaining
healthy relationships later in life and that they are predis-
posed to self-destructive behavior including drug and alcohol
abuse as well as prostitution. 82 The proponents of the civil
rights ordinances maintain that the women used to make
pornography are often the victims of abuse themselves.8 3
Women have testified that they were tricked, forced or
blackmailed into performing pornographic acts . 4 Moreover,
the link between pornography and prostitution is well-docu-
mented. 81
" See id. at 762 (value of such depiction "is exceedingly modest, if not de
minimus).
79 See id. at 763-64.
For a list of states that have enacted laws regulating child pornography, see id.
at 749 n.2.
11 See id. at 758 n.9.
82 See id.
" See Allred, supra note 52. The civil rights ordinances specify that a woman's
apparent consent to the performance of pornographic acts does not constitute a defense
to a charge of coercion into pornographic performances. See INDIANAPOLIs ORD. ch. 16,
§ 16-3 (g)(5)(A)(I)-(XIII) (1984); Proposed Minneapolis Ord. § 4, (m)(2)(i)-(xiii) (1983).
See K. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (1979); P. BOGDANOVICH, THE KILLING
OF THE UNICORN: DOROTHY STaxrrEN 1960-1980 (1984); S. GRIFFIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND
SILENCE (1981); L. LOVELACE, ORDEAL (1980).
8 See S. GRIFFIN, supra note 84, at 112.
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The second justification noted by the Court-that the
permanency of the depictions exacerbates the harm to the
abused children-is equally persuasive with respect to women
portrayed in pornography. The Court's recognition that the
privacy interests of child models is invaded by the record-
ing and distribution of pornographic materials86 could easily
be extended to women.
The Court also noted that the distribution of child por-
nography was prohibited, since it inherently involved an il-
legal act-the production of child pornography.8 7 The
production of adult pornography, however, is legal in every
state, unless it involves the actual murder, rape, sodomy or
battery of a woman.1
The Court found the value of child pornography to be
de minimus.89 Many opponents of pornography argue that
there is also little, if any, redeeming value to depictions of
rape, torture and mutilation of women. 90 Moreover, the
Court suggested in Ferber that a person over the statutory
age could be used to depict children performing sexual acts
"if it were necessary for literary or artistic value." 9' This
caveat retains a focus on the illegality of the specific un-
derlying act, while the civil rights ordinances would take the
broader perspective of recognizing that any portrayal of the
degredation of women is itself an evil affecting women,
whether as participants, viewers, or victims of behavior pre-
cipitated by pornography. Throughout Ferber, the Court re-
ferred to the victims of child pornography as the children
actually used in the depictions, and not children as a class. 92
The civil rights ordinances would extend the class of plain-
tiffs further-to all persons offended by the pornography,
See 458 U.S. at 758 nn.9-10.
" See id. at 761 (the production of child pornography is "an activity illegal
throughout the Nation").
1 The movie "Snuff," for instance, depicted the actual murder of a woman.
Although produced in South America, the movie has been shown extensively throughout
the United States. See Fritz, Pornography as Gynocidal Propaganda, 8 N.Y.U. REv. L.
& Soc. CHaE 219, 219 (1978-79).
458 U.S. at 762.
90 See S. GRIFFIN, supra note 84, at 36.
' See 458 U.S. at 763.
92 See id. at 758.
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not just those depicted in it.93 The proponents of the civil
rights ordinances emphasize that pornography has a discrim-
inatory effect and injures the public welfare. 94
The Court balanced the competing interests involved in
the regulation of child pornography-the interests of society
and the children versus the first amendment protection of
freedom of expression. 95 This balancing of interests is the
very point that the proponents of the civil rights pornog-
raphy ordinances have emphasized. 96 "Free speech involves
balancing the rights of everyone, and at some point the
rights of the victim should limit the rights of the pornog-
rapher."97
In Ferber, the Court specifically limited its holding to
statutes that prohibit the distribution of visual depictions of
child pornography.9s The Court refused to expand the pro-
hibition to "descriptions or other depictions of sexual con-
duct, not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live
performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of
live performances." 99 The civil rights ordinances contain no
such limitation, prohibiting pornography "in pictures or in
words." °0
The Court did specify that all statutes imposing criminal
sanctions for the dissemination of child pornography con-
See INDIANAPOuS ORD. ch. 16, § 16-17(b); Proposed Minneapolis Ord. § 4,(1)(3).
See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
See 458 U.S. at 763-64.
Women's struggle to achieve and preserve individual identity and self-
respect has been a long one. Courts at times have advanced this endeavor and
at times have held it back. As the ultimate arbiter of social control and social
relations, our legal system is faced with the contradictory role of protecting
the property interests of the powerful and the individual rights of the weak.
This contradiction often results in a balancing process whereby competing
social interests are weighed .... Constitutional analysis ... has evolved into
a continual weighing of interests between the individual and the state, and
between conflicting constitutional rights.
Bryant, Sexual Display of Women's Bodies-A Violation of Privacy, 10 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REV. 1211, 1228 (1980) (citations omitted).
' Allred, supra note 52.
See 458 U.S. at 764.
Id. at 765.
See INDIANAPOLIS ORD. ch. 16, § 16-3 (q); Proposed Minneapolis Ord. § 3,
(gg)(1).
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tain "some element of scienter on the part of the defend-
ant."'' Since the civil rights ordinances authorize only civil
actions, they do not have to comport with this require-
ment.' 02
Thus, there are compelling arguments for extending the
child pornography analysis to make unprotected pornogra-
phy that subordinates women. However, the Court's present
requirement of inherent illegality and visual representation
make it unlikely that this analysis would be extended to
validate the ordinance.
E. Violent Pornography As A New Category
Of Unprotected Speech
Although pornography as defined by the civil rights or-
dinances may be protected speech under current definitions
of the first amendment, perhaps violent pornography should
be recognized as a new category of unprotected speech. The
Supreme Court in Ferber indicated its willingness to expand
the scope of unprotected speech,'0 3 and the proponents of
the civil rights ordinances hope that other courts will utilize
the balancing approach of Ferber.1°4
One of the strongest arguments against the enactment of
the ordinances is that there is no proof that pornography
leads to the commission of crimes against women. 05 How-
458 U.S. at 765.
,2 In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 (1973), the Supreme Court
noted that the state had "broad power to regulate commerce and protect the public
environment." The Court gave its general approval to the use of civil sanctions against
obscenity. See id. at 55-70.
'' See 458 U.S. at 753-66. See also text accompanying notes 69-102 supra.
'o See Allred, supra note 52.
In 1970, the Presidential Commission on Obscenity and Pornography stated:
[E]mpirical research designed to clarify the question has found no evidence
to date that exposure to explicit sexual materials plays a significant role in
the causation of delinquent or criminal behavior among youth or adults.
The Commission cannot conclude that exposure to erotic materials is a
factor in the causation of sex crime or sex delinquency.
COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PoRNoGRAPHY, TtE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
OBSCENIY AND PORNorRAHY 27 (1970).
The Commission concluded that sexually explicit materials might even have a
"cathartic effect," thereby preventing sexual crimes. See id. at 23-27. However, the
materials used in the studies on which the Commission based its conclusions would be
considered mild erotica by contemporary standards. See Gerety, Pornography and Viol-
ence, 40 U. Prrr. L. REv. 627, 641-42 (1979).
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ever, convicted sex offenders have testified that violent por-
nography "fueled the fire" of their criminal tendencies.1
0 6
One study found that thirty-nine per cent of convicted sex
offenders indicated that "pornogrphy had something to do
with [the perpetration of the crime] of which they were
convicted.' ' 0 7 Opponents of the pornography legislation be-
lieve that these occurrences are few and isolated, and are
inconclusive proof of a direct link between violent pornog-
raphy and the commission of crimes against women. 0°
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, while reading or
viewing violent pornography does not necessarily cause a
person to immediately commit the specific act depicted, the
attitudes of the person will be influenced, making the per-
son more predisposed to commit violent acts towards
women, and less sensitive to female victims of crime.' °9 As
MacKinnon states:
1' Edmund Kemper III was convicted for the murders of his grandparents at age
15, his mother at age 24, and six other women in between. Kemper stated that he often
read magazines to find depictions of corpses and frequented snuff movies. See Starr,
The Random Killers, NEwswaaz, Nov. 26, 1984, at 104-05.
107 B. LEISER, LIBERTY, JUSTICE AND MORALS 180 (2d ed. 1979).
101 See Nightline, supra note 6 (interview with Gay Talese).
'09 [T]he main evil of pornography is its general influence on attitudes, feel-
ings, inclinations, emotional stability, and moral standards. The flow of caus-
ality is not: (a) Pornography (causes) anti-social or criminal conduct (always)
but rather: (b) Pornography (causes) deviant moral/psychological attitudes
(usually) (which in turn cause or predispose to) anti-social or criminal conduct
(more often than such conduct would occur had attitudes not been predisposed
to tolerate and even enjoy such conduct).
Stanmeyer, Obscene Evils v. Obscure Truths: Some Notes on First Principles, 7 CAP.
U.L. REv. 647, 664 (1978).
This hypothesis was borne out in a study conducted by Dr. Neil M. Malamuth, a
psychologist at the University of Manitoba. He conducted an experiment designed to
test the attitudinal and behavioral changes of men who viewed violent pornographic
films. A group of several hundred students watched a number of films including two
depicting extremely violent sexual acts against women. An attitudinal survey was admin-
istered to the students both before and after they viewed the films. Specific questions
about their attitudes toward violence and women were embedded in the questionaire.
The researcher found that "exposure to films portraying violent sexuality increased male
subjects' acceptance of interpersonal violence against women." Feshback & Malamuth,
Sex and Aggression: Proving the Link, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Nov. 1978, at 111.
For further discussion of the link between pornography and aggression, see, e.g.,
Court, Pornography and Sex-crimes: A Re-evaluation in the Light of Recent Trends
Around the World, 5 INT'L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 129 (1977); Gray, Exposure to
Pornography and Aggression Toward Women: The Case of the Angry Male, 4 Soc.
PROBS. 387 (1982); Malamuth, Testing Hypotheses Regarding Rape: Exposure to Sexual
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Each time men are sexually aroused by pornography-the
sexually explicit subordination of women-they learn to
connect women's sexual pleasure to abuse and women's
sexual nature to inferiority. They learn this in their bod-
ies, not just their minds, so that it becomes a physical,
seemingly natural, response. When real women claim not
to want inequality or force, they are not credible com-
pared with the continually sexually available "real women"
in pornography. These men are the same normal men who
make decisions that control much of women's lives and
opportunities at every level of society. Until women achieve
equal power with men, such men are in a position to
control women's employment, educational advancement,
social status and credibility in the media, on paper, on
the street, in meetings, in court, in their own homes, and
in public office." 0
In sum, whether violent pornography falls outside the
protection of the first amendment depends on the willing-
ness of courts to recognize the connection between pornog-
raphy and the commission of crimes against women."'
III. ANALYSIS UNDER THREE IMPORTANT
FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES
Assuming that pornography as defined by the civil rights
pornography ordinances is held to be unprotected speech, the
ordinances must still be scrutininized under three important
doctrines to determine if they pass constitutional muster: the
overbreadth doctrine; the void-for-vaguness doctrine; and the
doctrine of prior restraint.
Violence, Sex Differences and the "Normality" of Rapists, J. RESEARCH PERSONALITY
(1979); Malamuth, Heim & Feshbach, Sexual Responsiveness of College Students to
Rape Depictions: Inhibitory and Disinhibitory Effects, 3 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC.
PSYCH. 399 (1980); Zillman and Bryant, Pornography, Sexual Callousness, and the
Trivialization of Rape, 4 J. CoM. 10 (1982).
Memorandum, supra note 21, at 2.
Courts have sometimes hesitated to acknowledge the link between the viewing
of violence and the perpetration of crime. See, e.g., Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting
Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 511, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978) (refused to recognize a nine-
year-old girl's argument that her gang rape was a copycat of the depiction of a similar
rape of a young girl in the television movie "Born Innocent"); Zamora v. State, 361
So. 2d 776, 779-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (disallowed defendant's insanity defense
based upon the subliminal effect of viewing television violence).
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A. The Overbreadth Doctrine
To be valid, the civil rights pornography ordinances must
not be unconstitutionally overbroad. "As with all legislation
in this sensitive area [i.e., free speech], the conduct to be
prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state
law, as written or authoritatively construed.""' 2
Generally, a party to whom a statute is constitutionally
applicable may not attack the statute because it may not
always be applied constitutionally in situations not before the
court."3 The first amendment overbreadth doctrine is a rec-
ognized exception to this general rule." 4 It permits a party
to challenge a statute not because his or her free speech
has been violated, "but because of a judicial predication or
assumption that the statute's very existence may cause oth-
ers not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression. '1" 5  However, the Supreme
Court in Broderick v. Oklahoma held that the overbreadth
of a statute must be "substantial" before the statute will
be held unconstitutional on its face. 116
The Court in Ferber sustained the statute in question as
"not substantially overbroad. ""7 It held that "the possible
impermissible applications of the statute amounted to a tiny
fraction of the materials [conceivably] within the statute's
reach."" 8 The same argument could be made for the civil
1 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973) (citing Austin v. The Alder-
men, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 694, 698-99 (1869)) (holding an Oklahoma statute prohibiting
political solicitation and campaigning by state employees not unconstitutional on its face
since the statute gave adequate warning of proscribed behavior as applied to the appel-
lants).
4 Id. at 612.
'is Id.
116 See id. at 615-16. The Court further stated:
Although ... laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to
some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect-at best a
prediction-cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its
face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct
that is admittedly within its power to proscribe.
Id. at 615.
" See 458 U.S. at 773. ("We consider this the paradigmatic case of a state statute
whose legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications.").
118 Id.
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rights pornography ordinance. For example, the ordinances
would prohibit the depiction of body parts exhibited in such
a way that women are reduced to these parts." 9 This de-
scription could easily apply to medical textbooks. However,
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence in Ferber, dismissed a
similar argument by stating that depictions in textbooks
"might not trigger the compelling interests identified by the
Court."'' 2 Similarly, the depictions of women in textbooks
would not trigger the same interests identified by the draf-
ters of the civil rights ordinances.' 2' Although the ordi-
nances could be applied impermissibly to protected speech,
" 'whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through
case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its
sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.' "122
B. The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is based upon the same
rationale as the overbreadth doctrine.'23 In NAACP v. But-
ton, 2 4 the Court held that statutes affecting first amend-
ment rights must be drawn with "narrow specificity."' 25 In
Smith v. Goguen, 26 the Court held that the void-for-vague-
ness doctrine
requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for
law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to
prevent "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Where
a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court
interpretation, is capable of reaching 6xpression sheltered
by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater
degree of specificity than in other contexts.' 27
"9 See INDIANAPOLIS ORD. ch. 16, § 16-3 (q)(3) ("Women are presented as sexual
objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered
or truncated or fragmented or severed into body parts"); Proposed Minneapolis Ord. §
3, (gg)(1)(vi) ("Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated
or bruised or physically hurt").
458 U.S. at 775.
' See note 27 supra.
458 U.S. at 773-74 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 615-16).
J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW 871 (1982).
,2 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
Id. at 433 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940)).
52 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
11 Id. at 572-73 (citations omitted).
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The drafters of the civil rights pornography ordinances
claim to have avoided the void-for-vagueness doctrine by
writing "an extremely concrete law."' 2 8 MacKinnon notes:
"This is not like obscenity law, which is written in order
to include a whole lot of possibilities for interpretation and
local variation. This law is extremely concrete. It's not only
... narrow, but it's very specific. It doesn't give that kind
of room.' ' 29 MacKinnon states that only sexually explicit
subordinations of women are pornographic under the ordi-
nance and that the term "sexually explicit" has substantial
legal meaning. 30 But, of course, the term "subordination"
does not; it is subject to different interpretations. However,
the examples listed in the statute do provide some degree
of fair notice and warning to booksellers and arguably
"conve[y] sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and
practices."31
C. The Doctrine of Prior Restraint
"When speech is suppressed in advance of publication
or distribution-instead of being permitted to enter the
marketplace of ideas before being identified and regulated
as unprotected speech-it has been subjected to a prior re-
straint. "132 Prior restraint of speech is considered more se-
rious than subsequent punishment. 33
The Supreme Court has held that obscenity, since it is
unprotected speech, may be restrained before distribution. 34
The Court in Freedman v. Maryland 35 imposed certain pro-
cedural safeguards that must be incorporated into any sta-
tutory scheme authorizing prior restraint: (1) the person
seeking to restrain speech has the burden of proving that
the speech is unprotected; (2) an adversarial, prompt and
'12 Nightline, supra note 6 , at 4 (interview with Catherine MacKinnon).
Id. at 4.
See id. at 5.
,' See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
2 Note, supra note 13, at 1493 (citations omitted).
"' NowAK, supra note 123, at 871.
,34 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973).
- 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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final adjudication of obscenity must be imposed by statute
or judicial construction; and (3) any prior restraint before
judicial review should be limited in duration.1 36
The civil rights pornography ordinances should comply
with the Freedman requirements. The Indianapolis Ordi-
nance, for example, states that a public hearing before an
investigative committee must be held within ten days after
the filing of a complaint charging sex discrimination on the
basis of pornography. The parties are allowed to subpoena
and cross-examine witnesses. The committee must issue a
report recommending findings of fact within thirty days of
the hearing. Either party may appeal to an administrative
board within thirty days. If the board determines that a
discriminatory practice has occured, it may file a complaint
in circuit court. Judicial review of the board's findings is
de novo and the board bears the burden of proof. No in-
junctive relief will issue until a final judicial determination
has been made.'3 7
This scheme meets all of the Freedman requirements,
except that a finding of unlawful sex discrimination on the
basis of pornography, rather than a finding of obscenity, is
sufficient to merit injunctive relief. However, if pornogra-
phy is held to be unprotected speech, the ordinances should
be held constitutional.
CONCLUSION
The proponents of stricter pornography laws insist that
sanctions against violent pornography are "a necessary so-
lution to an otherwise intractable problem."' 38 However,
others have suggested that "educat[ing] the public on por-
nography's dangers, and ... rais[ing] 'public awareness so
that consumption of pornography is socially ostracized,' may
be more effective than isolated actions against certain pub-
lications and pornographers."' 13 9 This may be an admirable
goal, but it is little more than wishful thinking. Violent
See id. at 58-59.
See INDIANAPOLIS ORD. ch. 16, §§ 16-17, 26-27.
'" Allred, supra note 52.
,3 Di toota, supra note 4, at 204.
1984-1985] 1107
1108 KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 73
pornography in America has reached an unacceptable level
and legislators are justified in their concern. The civil rights
pornography ordinances should be recognized as constitu-
tional means to end this social evil.
Valerie J. Hamm
